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     The relevance that corruption has gained in law and in international politics has increased 
notably in recent years. On a global scale, instruments and policies related to these practices have 
been implemented due to the demands of international commerce, the prevention of international 
crime, good corporate governance, transparency and responsibility in the public sectors, as well 
as a better understanding of the effects of corruption on economic development, political stability 
and the rule of law.  
      The fight against international corruption arose in the United States at the end of the 
seventies with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, promoted by the administration of 
Jimmy Carter (Llamzon, 2014, pp.45, para.4.06). This law sanctioned for the first time a 
behavior that until then was unpunished, corruption of foreign public officials. Years later, in 
1997, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development or OECD approved the 
Anti-Corruption Convention of Foreign Public Agents in International Commercial Transactions. 
This was followed by many other international conventions, such as the Criminal and Civil 
Conventions on Corruption of 1999 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. As 
expected, the new order and the importance that corruption has gained are increasingly reflected 
in the corresponding writings and arguments of the parties in international arbitration, as has 
occurred in some investment arbitrations.  
     Corruption has expanded in a generalized manner across all continents and among many 
institutions, until it has reached international commercial and investment arbitration proceedings. 
Arbitration is not a new forum for the issues of corruption; arbitrators have effectively and 




        As will be observed in a comprehensive study of corruption decisions in international 
investment arbitration, corruption issues arise in foreign investment and also in foreign 
investment disputes regarding the bilateral investment treaty (BIT), leading to undesirable 
outcomes. So, it seems that there are some questions that beg a more definitive view, such as, 
what are the arbitrators to do when allegations of corruption arose? What is the applicable law? 
Which standard of proof should be applied? Who is responsible? This study endeavors to address 
these issues that leave arbitral tribunals and national courts in a quandary every time the issue of 
corruption is alleged.  
      The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate and determine the liability of states and the 
standard of proof used by arbitrators in investor-state arbitration cases involving corruption 
allegations, analyzing some investor-state arbitral cases. This study delineates these controversial 
concerns and analyzes practical solutions within the context of theory and practice.  
       In order to accomplish this, different working methodologies will be applied. This thesis is 
organized in three distinct chapters: chapter 1 analysis the phenomenon of corruption and gives 
an overview regarding international arbitration and the concept of standard of proof. On chapter 
2, the thesis explores the real problem regarding the standard of proof in international arbitration, 
explaining the different ways evidence should be valued; also, some arbitral cases from the 
ICSID will help to provide a better overview. Finally, in chapter 3, since the articles on state 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts are of high importance, the responsibility of states 
for this matter will be analyzed and the approach between corruption and the environment will 





Chapter 1: Corruption and International Arbitration 
1. Corruption as an increasing concern in International Arbitration 
      “Despite decades of international efforts against it, corruption continues to present multiple 
challenges to governments, businesses, academics, and the public” (Ledeneva, 2018, p. 418). 
Corruption is called nowadays, the dark side of globalization, it affects economic development, 
political stability, democracy, fundamental human rights, rule of law and more recently the 
environment. It affects the sets of values, principles and rules that govern the law in its entirety.  
       Corruption means different things to different people, “it is a polyvalent word”, “corruption 
identifies a concept everyone instinctively understands but would find hard to articulate 
completely” (Llamzon, 2014, pp.19, para. 2.01).  A specific idea of corruption can vary greatly 
across countries, societies, and even individuals. “That is why it becomes difficult to define it. In 
sum, corruption is a cross-systematic, cross-temporal and cross-cultural phenomenon. It can exist 
in any place, at any time, and under any form of government” (Farrales, 2005, p.12). Corruption 
includes certain behaviors such as fraud, money laundering, drug smuggling, bribery, extortion 
and black market operations, among others. It harms democratic institutions, slows economic 
development and contributes to international political instability. According to Transparency 
International or T.I.1, corruption is the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. On the other 
hand, one of the principal anti-corruption treaties, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, does not 
contain a definition of corruption at all. Instead, it focuses on bribery of a foreign public official, 
which the treaty defines in the following terms:  
                                                             
1 It is a global movement that gives voice to the victims and witnesses of corruption. T.I. works together with 




To offer, promise, or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or 
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to 
the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other 
improper advantages (Llamzon, 2014, pp.20).  
      Corruption can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of 
money lost and the sector where it occurs. According to T.I., the “abuse of high-level power that 
benefits the few at the expense of the many, and causes serious and widespread harm to 
individuals and society” is known as “grand corruption”. Secondly, “everyday abuse of entrusted 
power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to 
access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other 
agencies” is defined as “petty corruption”. Finally, “political corruption” according to T.I. is the 
“manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and 
financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and 
wealth”.  
      According to Transparency International and the Corruption Perceptions Index of 20172, the 
majority of countries are making little or no progress in ending corruption. The Index found that 
more than two-thirds of countries score below 50, with an average score of 43. The Cleanest 
countries are New Zealand, Denmark and Finland and the most corrupt are Syria, South Sudan 
                                                             
2 The index ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to 





and Somalia. Chile is in the 26th position with a score of 67 and Germany is in the 12th position 
with a score of 81 points.  
       On the other hand, international arbitration is an alternative to the domestic judicial system 
where parties from different countries may resolve their disputes without filing a lawsuit in 
court. It is a consensual process based upon the parties’ mutual agreement to use arbitration as 
the dispute resolution method in which a non-governmental decision-maker examines the dispute 
and manufactures a legally final, binding and enforceable ruling (Bhojwani, 2012, p.76-77). 
Recently, arbitration has become a very common practice in global relations, with a variety of 
topics to deal with.  
      In recent times, there has emerged a relationship between corruption and international 
arbitration. Wrongdoings have appeared in commercial and investment arbitral cases. Corruption 
can arise at any time during the arbitration process; it may originate before, during and after the 
contract but also, during the arbitral structure and appointment of arbitrators. Arbitral tribunals 
have limited jurisdiction and limited power to compel parties to produce evidence, that is why, 
arbitration was not been the perfect mechanism to judge corruption. However, accusations about 
corruption in arbitral cases have increased dramatically. Corruption normally arises in two ways, 
in the context of international arbitrations. First, in investor-state arbitrations, where a state 
accuses an investor of obtaining a concession or other investment opportunity by way of 
corruption. Secondly, corruption can arise in the context of commercial arbitration, in a subtler 
way, payments to third parties by intermediaries, that appear not to be legitimate, and disputes 
arise as to the payment of sums due under such contractual agreements. Also, arbitral tribunals 




provide evidence or raise suspicions of wrongdoings. These are the situations that make 
arbitrators hesitate to recognize their jurisdiction.  
         Nowadays, there are many bilateral, multi or plurilateral investment treaties that underpin 
what we call international investment. International investment arbitration has emerged as the 
most effective means of resolving investor-state disputes. The International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes or ICSID is the world´s leading institution devoted to international 
investment dispute settlement. It was established in 1966 by the ICSID Convention. Regarding 
disputes:  
The type of dispute covered by the Convention is limited in several respects. It 
must be a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. The dispute must be 
between a Contracting State – a country that has become a party to the 
Convention by signing and ratifying it – or a designated constituent subdivision or 
agency of the State on the one hand and a national of another Contracting State on 
the other hand (Parra, 2012, p.8). 
     Allegations about corruption in investor-state arbitration have been increasing, high levels of 
corruption, bribery and unstable economic policies can decrease the amount of foreign 
investment that a state might expect. That is why arbitration has been used to resolve the 
emerging disputes from it.  
       Within investment arbitration, corruption can arise in different situations. As I said above, 
the most common is when an investor submits an application for arbitration to repair monetary 
damages caused by a host-state´s contraventions of the investment treaty. The host state may 




treaty protection on the grounds of the infringement of the host-state´s law (Uluc, 2016, p.7). By 
attacking the underlying contract with claims of corruption, states seek to dismiss any claims 
based upon the contract and thus dismiss jurisdiction of the tribunal.  
       It is important to establish here that one of the consequences of corruption can be the 
declaration of nullity of the main contract or the arbitration clause or agreement. In international 
arbitration there are three criteria to determine the validity of the contract: domestic law, 
international public policy and defective consent. Beginning with domestic law, it illustrates how 
corruption can vary from one country to another. A good example of this is the World Duty Free 
Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya arbitral case (ICSID, 2006), where the tribunal 
applied domestic law and found the underlying contract unenforceable. Next, comes 
international public policy and order set of values, principles and rules that govern the 
international community. In this regard, an ICSID tribunal stated in the Niko Resources v. 
Bangladesh, BAPEX, and Petrobangla case (ICSID, 2013):  
Normally, arbitral tribunals respect and give effect to contracts concluded by the 
parties which agreed on the arbitration clause from which they derive their 
powers. However, party autonomy is not without limits. In international 
transactions the most important of such limits is that of international public policy. 
A contract in conflict with international public policy cannot be given effect by 
arbitrators. 
       The last criteria is to investigate defects of the parties’ consent, commonly used in litigation. 
In sum, contracts, treaties, clauses and rules that are contrary to international public policy will 
not be honored by arbitrators. Once the validity of the main contract is determined, the 




contract is declared null, the arbitration clause should as well. However, there is a doctrine 
known as “separability” or “separability presumption” that helps resolve the issue.  
      The doctrine of separability permits the separation of an arbitration agreement from the 
contract if there are defects in the underlying contract. This principle is universally accepted and 
allows arbitral tribunal to retain jurisdiction notwithstanding a voided contract (Born, 2009, 
p.312).  
       A question that must be raised in terms of corruption allegations is the applicable law to 
determine the existence of wrongdoings, because the same behavior can be corrupt in one 
country but not in another. So, the law of the place or seat of arbitration, the law applicable to the 
merits of the matter and the law of the place of performance of the obligation, play a relevant 
role to these effects.      
     The virus of corruption exists, it is alive and will seek to survive and spread. International law 
must maintain the current antidotes to fight it and keep it away. Currently, there is a certain 
consensus that corruption is an arbitral subject. Examinations into corruption by a tribunal fall 
within its competence, if the existence of corruption is relevant to the resolution of the dispute 
submitted to it. Corruption in these cases opens the door to the demands of innocent foreign 
investors for violations of fair and equitable treatment. In most cases, international jurisprudence 
has not ruled in favor of invertors for lack of evidence of corruption. The arbitration system has 
become a tool for unscrupulous people to obtain undue benefits. Transparency will play a very 
important role in the purge of the arbitration institution. Cases with allegations of corruption 
have increased in recent years, in Latin America one of the most famous cases is the Odebrecht 
case in Brazil. In this case, a Brazilian construction company paid corrupt commissions in order 




benefits.  The Department of Justice of the United States is in charge of the investigation since 
some years ago. All these factors have played an important role in increasing the current level of 
enforcement about corruption in Brazil (Duprad and Pagotto, 2018, pp.91). Many of the disputes 
must be solved in the commercial arbitration room.  
     If we observe the work done by arbitrators in the last decade, as I will analyze in the next 
chapter, we can realize that with respect to allegations of corruption, arbitral tribunals have taken 
a more legalistic or formalistic attitude. The arbitrator tries to put aside his personal and 
philosophical opinions about corruption and replaces it with the means of proof. So, if one of the 
parties alleges corruption, the arbitrators first consider whether there is any other exception to 
their jurisdiction that is more evident and easy to analyze, if there is no other exception, the 
tribunal admits to study the merits of the corruption case, according to the arbitration procedure 
and the means of proof, finally, to dictate whether or not corruption has really existed. All 
arbitration decisions must not only be motivated but must be carried out in accordance with the 
applicable law and the arbitrator´s own jurisdiction. Therefore, analyzing the standards of proof 
of the arbitral tribunals becomes more important.  
 
2. General considerations regarding means of evidence, burden and standard of proof 
     Arbitrators still labor with today´s important and controversial issues, such as the standard of 
proof, the burden of proof, and evidence to be brought. Corruption has been part of human life 
for thousands of years, it is really difficult to prove because secrecy is inherent in these cases. 




corruption? Who carries the burden of proof? What is the level of the standard of proof? Who is 
responsible? This study and research aim to answer these questions.  
      The concepts of burden and standard of proof cause ambiguity and confusion in the context 
of international arbitration. A tribunal is not bound by complex rules of evidence or an 
appropriate standard of proof. There is no single theory or rule applicable regarding the burden 
of proof (Born, 2009). All of this, because one of the most important characteristics of arbitration 
that differentiates it from litigation is the flexibility of rules, where the parties can choose and 
decide all the proceeding. Consequently, “the use of rules of evidence would tend to constrain 
the very flexibility arbitration promises to provide” (Laird and others, 2018, p.4).  
     It is a national and an international principle that each party has to prove the facts upon which 
they rely to corroborate their claim or defense. It has been recognized by the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panels, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the UNCITRAL Rules3, 
as well as in other international conventions and organizations. As a general rule, this principle 
operates similarly in international arbitration and it determines by the “burden of proof”.  
     The burden of proof is unquestionably borne by the party that wants to make a fact evident. 
Through this, the party wants to persuade the tribunal that its facts are evident and its petitum 
must prevail. Usually, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff. However, it can often fall on the 
defendant, depending on the circumstances.  
                                                             
3 For example, Article 24 provides: “Every party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his 




     The second important principle is to reach the required level of persuasion determined by 
decision-makers, known as the “standard of proof”. “Participants in investor-state arbitration 
typically submit that there is only one rule of evidence: the free appreciation of evidence by the 
arbitrator” (Schreuer and others, 2009).  
     It is important to highlight the difference between the burden and standard of proof, and 
according to the ICSID case No. ARB/06/3, The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania (2013):  
The Tribunal believes that the distinction between the two can be stated quite 
simply: the burden of proof defines which party has to prove what, in order for its 
case to prevail; the standard of proof defines how much evidence is needed to 
establish either an individual issue or the party´s case as whole. As soon as the 
distinction is stated in that way, it becomes evident that the burden of proof is 
absolute, whereas the standard of proof is relative. 
     There are different levels of the standard of proof including prima facie, preponderance of 
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. As I will analyze in the 
next chapter, the standard of proof depends on whether we are taking about a civil or a criminal 
case. According to Scheweizer (2013):  
Common law knows (at least) two different standards of proof, the 
“preponderance of evidence” (or “balance of probabilities in English Law) for 
civil cases and the “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in criminal cases. 
      In general, identifying the appropriate standard of proof in arbitral cases has been a 
challenge; most arbitral rules and international law do not provide detailed norms on the standard 




a no guidance conducting arbitral tribunal to the appropriate standard of proof. Much of the 
times, arbitral tribunals use their discretion to define a standard of proof. Sometimes, parties 
integrate into their contract a point relating to the standard of proof, so the arbitrator can follow 
it. The arbitral precedent in this respect exhibits that the majority of arbitral awards advocate a 
higher standard of proof due to the seriousness of the corruption allegations and its significant 
legal repercussions. However, establishing a standard of proof makes it easier for arbitrators to 
assess the evidence in each specific case and in this way, justify their decisions correctly.  
      The question that the standard of proof raises is what level of evidence is required to 
establish either a fact or an entire case? It is a rather complex question to answer that I will try to 
address in the next chapter.  













Chapter 2: Standard of Proof of Corruption in Investor-State International Arbitration 
      As I have indicated previously, most of the arbitration rules, national arbitration laws and 
international arbitration conventions do not contain specific rules on the burden and standard of 
proof, let alone in cases about corruption. Establishing corruption is, as a matter of fact, difficult. 
Corrupt payments will usually be hidden by seemingly legal transactions. In ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/13 Award, EDF Services Limited v. Romania (2009, para.221), the tribunal expressed 
sympathy for the investor´s position, that “[I]n any case, however, corruption must be proven 
and is notoriously difficult to prove since, typically, there is little or no physical evidence”. This 
makes it difficult for arbitrators to assess the evidence. “Further, identifying the appropriate 
standard of proof poses enormous problems due to varying conception of the standards in civil 
and common law traditions” (Sourgens, Duggal and Laird, 2018, p.76).  
      However, there are some laws and rules applicable to the burden and standard of proof in 
international arbitration. For example, articles 494 and 505 of the Vienna Convention refer to 
corruption of a representative of a state and fraud and article 24 (1)6 of the UNCITRAL Rules 
applies in international arbitration as a general principle known as actori incumbit probatio. In 
other words, in international arbitration, it is axiomatic that each party bears the burden of 
proving the facts relied on in support of its defense. However, no rule clearly establishes a 
standard of evidence applied to an arbitral case.  
                                                             
4 “If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the 
State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty”. 
 
5 “If the expression of a State´s consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured through the corruption of its 
representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as 
invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty”.  
 




      Despite the absence of rules or laws regarding the standard of proof in international 
arbitration, arbitrators will attempt to base a decision on the burden and standard of proof and 
will attempt to establish the relevant facts with reasonable certainty irrespective of the burden 
and standard of proof. Even so, there are three standards of proof identified in investor-state 
arbitration. These are the pro tem or prima facie evidence, the balance of probabilities or 
preponderance of evidence and a higher standard of proof; arbitrators have had problems 
evaluating allegations of corruption since they are not judges, they do not have the same 
enforcement powers of a court to compel the production of evidence; then, evaluating the 
standard of proof has become a “headache” for arbitrators.  
      As the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) tribunal constituted in Case No. 6497 
(1994) remarked: “The party alleging corruption has the burden of proof. Such party may bring 
some relevant evidence for its allegations, without these elements being really conclusive”. This 
presupposes the idea of discretion of the arbitrators to evaluate evidence. Rose (2014, p.193) 
established that:  
The procedural rules of ICSID, ICC and UNCITRAL leave the standard of proof to the 
discretion of the tribunal, and in practice tribunals have varied in their views on how 
stringently they should assess evidence of corruption. The instruments that regulate 
arbitral proceedings provide relatively little guidance on evidentiary matters, such as 
which party has the burden of proof, what sort of evidence the parties should present, and 
the standard of proof by which tribunals should evaluate the evidence before them … 
While these instruments offer somewhat varying levels of guidance to tribunals on 




under each set of procedural rules, tribunals have considerable freedom to adopt the 
standard of proof that they consider appropriate in the given circumstances. 
    Likewise, there is no clear consensus as to the standard of proof to be applied in investor-state 
arbitration, in respect of allegations of corruption. As I remarked before, civil and common law 
countries have differences in their perspectives of standards of proof. For civil law countries, the 
standard of proof is known as the “inner conviction of the judge”, or in the case of arbitration, 
the inner conviction of the arbitrator. In it, the only higher degree of probability required by the 
law is the criminal standard, known as “beyond reasonable doubt”. On the other hand, in 
common law countries, a higher standard of proof is necessary, in respect of alleging corruption, 
because of the seriousness of the allegations. From this perspective, a great difference is found. 
Some arbitrators come from a civil law education, and others from a common law one, this 
makes it even more difficult to establish a standard of proof.  
       The prevailing arbitral practice regarding the standard of proof required for allegations of 
corruption is a high standard of proof. Karsten and Berkeley (2003, p.115-117) established that: 
In a survey of arbitral case law on corruption, it was found that in just one out of twenty-
five cases, a “low” standard of proof was applied, whereas in fourteen cases, a “high” 
standard of proof applied, which were variously described as “certainty”, “clear proof”, 
“clear and convincing evidence”, and “conclusive evidence”.   
      In case No. ARB/05/15, Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt ICSID (2009, para. 326), the tribunal remarked: “It is common in most legal systems for 
serious allegations such as fraud to be held to a high standard of proof”. Also, in ICSID Case No. 




“There is general consensus among international tribunal and commentators regarding the need 
for a high standard of proof of corruption”. That is to say, the applicable standard of proof is 
greater than the balance of probabilities but less than beyond reasonable doubt. 
2.1 Corruption in Investor-State International Arbitration 
     Investment arbitration has been a useful tool in the settlement of disputes between investors 
and the host state. Corruption may arise in numerous ways in investment arbitrations since they 
are based on international treaties. “It is generally alleged when respondents seek to dismiss 
plaintiff´s claims, which are generally contractual, such as damages or failure to perform” (Uluc, 
2016, p.6).  
     According to Lamm and Menaker (2016, p.424):  
“Allegations of bribery and corruption are increasingly common in investor-state 
disputes and have played a critical role therein. In particular, allegations of 
corruption have been raised by host States as a defense to either the tribunal´s 
jurisdiction or the admissibility of the claimant´s claims. Such allegations also 
have been raised by investors, who have argued that attempts by public officials to 
solicit bribes constitute violations of the fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) 
standard and other treaty provision”.  
     In other words, within investment arbitration, states allege corruption to dismiss the claim as a 
defense of the claimant´s claim; and, investors allege corruption to get a monetary reparation for 
the damages caused by the host state. Moreover, in these cases, the investor is required to make 
the investment in accordance with the legislation of the host state. If the investor does it through 




jurisdiction. Also, it may be the case that corruption have been made by the two parties, applying 
the previous statement, the host state can be released from liability, a huge problem.  
      About the consequences of corruption in investment arbitration Lamm and Menaker (2016, 
p.435) have explained: “[a]lthough many tribunals have remarked on the standard and burden of 
proof applicable to corruption allegations, very few tribunals have had occasion to analyze the 
consequences of a finding of corruption”. The first ICSID case in which corruption was 
addressed as a topic was the World Duty Free Co or WDF. v. Kenya ICSID case (2006). The 
investment issue at this case was a contract for the construction, maintenance, and operation of 
duty-free complexes at the international airports in Mombasa and Nairobi, in Kenya.  
     This case was based on the breach of a contract. Mr. Ali, president of the WDF, wanted to 
obtain the concession mentioned before. His Kenyan partner, Mr. Sajjad, recommended that he 
raise the request to obtain the concession directly to the President of Kenya. To do this, they 
went to the official residence of the President, carrying a briefcase with 2 million dollars, which 
they handed over to the president´s personal assistant. When they left, the assistant returned the 
case, but the dollars had been removed and it was full of corn. President Moi effectively ordered 
that the contract for duty-free stores be granted to WDF. Years later, problems arose in the 
execution of the contract and the Kenyan government canceled it on the grounds that the contract 
had been obtained through corrupt payments. Without taking into account that corruption came 
from both sides, on one hand, who gave the money and on the other who received it. So, WDF 
requested an arbitration.  
     The tribunal dismissed the WDF´s claim on the basis that corruption is contrary to 
international public order, and contrary to the applicable law of the contract, English and Kenyan 




the international public order was enough to dismiss the case and leave the state of Kenya 
without liability, since the tribunal did not accept the actions of the president as attributable to 
the state of Kenya, a topic that I will analyze in the next chapter.  
     As I analyzed in the previous case, the consequences of corruption in investment arbitration 
are devastating, for both parties and the arbitral tribunal. For these reasons, establishing a correct 
standard of proof presupposes a greater responsibility for arbitrators.  
2.2 Prima Facie Evidence as a Standard of Proof 
     Identifying the appropriate standard of proof in arbitral cases has been a challenge for 
arbitrators. The first standard they have recognized is known as the pro tem or prima facie 
evidence. It occurs during the jurisdictional phase of the arbitral procedure. In words of Laird 
and others (2018, p.78), “the standard involves examination of the facts as alleges by the 
claimant to see whether such facts would amount to a breach of the treaty [underlying an 
investment treaty arbitration] and otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of the tribunal”.  
     According to this standard, a fact is presumed to be correct while no evidence is presented to 
proof the contrary. Laird and others (2018, p.78 - 79) state that:  
 “Under the pro tem standard, a claimant must submit evidence that, if unbranded, would 
meet the standard of proof to establish jurisdiction and further must plead, but not prove, 
sufficient facts to assert a claim for which relief may be granted. For matters that do not 
concern jurisdictional matters, the most common approach has been to follow the pro tem 





     In Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, an ICSID case (2013), “the Republic of Uzbekistan submitted 
that certain facts are inherently difficult to prove. Therefore, the party alleging such facts may 
sustain its burden of proof through prima facie evidence, evidence which if unexplained or 
uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed”.  
     It is important to determine here that there are some issues that must be proven in their 
entirety in the jurisdictional phase. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal must be clearly 
proven and can be proven through prima facie evidence, for example matters such as the 
nationality of the investor or the consent of the state, must be proven at this phase. Regarding the 
state´s consent, in ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips 
Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(Decision on jurisdiction and the merits, 2013, para.254) the tribunal established “in the words of 
the International Court of Justice in considering the very first challenge made to its jurisdiction, 
the consent must be voluntary and indisputable, and in words of both ICSID tribunals clear and 
unambiguous”. Secondly, in this phase also the arbitral tribunal determines if there are 
allegations about criminal situations7, if so, the tribunal decides that those allegations will need a 
higher standard of proof. So, the prima facie test will not be enough. However, some 
international tribunals have often accepted claims on the basis of prima facie evidence in 




                                                             




2.3 Balance of Probabilities or Preponderance Evidence 
     This is the most common standard of proof used in arbitral proceedings. Laird and others 
(2018, p.80), stated that “this standard requires an evaluation of all evidence produced by both 
parties on a particular issue and this evaluation would ultimately result in the tribunal 
determining which party´s evidence was more likely than not to be true”. In other words, all the 
evidence is bundled and considered at one time clearly for the purposes of determining whether 
the burden of persuasion has been met. The application of a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, would provide a heightened degree of clarity by obliging a panel to consider all 
proffered evidence at the same time.  
     In the words of Nathan O´Malley (2012, p.208): 
 The standard predominantly applied is quite often the balance of probabilities test, as 
was confirmed by an ICSID tribunal composed of well-experienced arbitrators. The 
balance of probabilities standard generally calls for a claim to be upheld if the Tribunal is 
convinced by the evidence that the claim is more likely than not true.  
      Also, C. F. Amesasinghe has explained ´preponderance of evidence´ as follows:  
Preponderance of evidence’ means generally that there is evidence greater in weight in 
comparison with the evidence adduced by the other party on the basis of reasonable 
probability rather than possibility. What tribunals do is to weigh the evidence proffered 
by both parties (and the facts judicially noted by the tribunal itself), in order to determine 
whether the weightier evidence is in favour of the actor (the claimant or party bearing the 
burden of proof). The tribunal determines whether it is a reasonably probable that 




moderate standard has been applied the non-actor may often claim, if he loses, that too 
light a standard of proof was applied, while, on the other hand, where the actor loses, he 
will probably claim that a stricter standard of proof than the ‘preponderance of evidence’ 
has been applied. 
     This standard would extend to most situations in investor-state arbitration, except the limited 
categories where a heightened standard of proof would apply. Indeed, tribunals have also applied 
this standard to a wide range of issues, such as establishing disputed facts at the jurisdictional 
phase, claims for damages, allegations of breach of contract, interpretation issues, factual 
controversies, and for breaches of standard of protection (Laird and others 2018, p.81-82).  
     The balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence standard is widely used in common 
law arbitration. However, some civil law arbitrators have observed that this standard is similar to 
the “inner conviction test” in which evidence is used to convince the judge or arbitrator. 
Whatever the judge considers appropriate in reaching the truth or moral certainty will be used in 
order to resolve any dispute.  
      In  ICSID case No. ARB/08/1, Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica (Award, 2012), 
the tribunal held: 
Whichever party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue and presents supporting 
evidence “must also convince the Tribunal of its truth, lest it be disregarded for want, or 
insufficiency, of proof.” The degree to which evidence must be proven can generally be 
summarized as a “balance of probability,” “reasonable degree of probability” or a 
preponderance of the evidence. Because no single precise standard has been articulated, 




      The application of the standard has been the subject of considerable debate, sometimes even 
between different members of the arbitral tribunal. The problem of this standard is that some of 
arbitrators have different points of view relating to evidence; persuading arbitrators becomes 
increasingly difficult considering this. Moreover, the tribunal has the broadest powers to assess 
the evidence as it deems reasonable, but when talking about acts of corruption it is indisputable 
that the tribunal must adopt a higher standard of proof than this one.  
2.4 A Higher Standard of Proof 
     As I have indicated previously, arbitral tribunals have adopted a higher standard of proof for 
allegations of corruption. Establishing corruption is, as a matter of fact, difficult. The evidence is 
usually not readily available. This standard is higher than the balance of probabilities or 
preponderance of evidence but lower than the standard of proof named beyond reasonable doubt, 
used in criminal law. In ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda 
Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Award, 2009 para.326) the tribunal pointed out that “it is 
common in most legal systems for serious allegations such as fraud to be held to a high standard 
of proof”.  
     Nathan O´Malley has explained the heightened standard of proof as follows: 
For those allegations of particular gravity, a tribunal may find it necessary to apply a 
higher standard of proof. One finds examples of this in sports arbitrations convened to 
consider questions over the use of performance-enhancing drugs, where tribunals often 
will, as a matter of practice, require more than the general balance of probabilities 
standard of proof applicable to most commercial and contract claims, but less than the 




as those brought on the basis of fraud or forgery, will attract a higher standard of proof 
which is articulated as requiring evidence that is clear and convincing or higher. The 
gravity of a claim is determined according to the nature of the allegation, not according to 
personage of the party against whom it is levelled. (Sourgens, Duggal and Laird, 2018, 
p.85-86). 
      Although there is no specific regulation relating to the law applicable to the standard of 
proof, as noted above, for cases involving corruption, bribery or fraud, a higher standard of proof 
should apply by virtue of the seriousness of the allegations.  
2.5 The Special Case on Corruption: Circumstantial Evidence  
     In practice, it is very rare that direct proof of corruption is available. Most arbitral tribunals 
have to content themselves with circumstantial evidence (Scherer, 2002, p.31). Moreover, as 
there will be a lack of direct evidence regarding allegations of corruption, mere insinuations of 
wrongdoings would not meet the high evidentiary standard and will not persuade arbitrators. 
However, circumstantial evidence plays an important role in arbitral cases when direct evidence 
will be almost impossible to have. Circumstantial evidence determines a different standard of 
proof on corruption issues. Investor-state tribunals have noted that circumstantial evidence could 
be admissible, particularly in situations where direct evidence might be difficult, but further 
corroboration would be necessary and a heightened standard above the balance of probabilities 
would apply.  
     It is recognized that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish corruption. Some 
arbitral tribunals add to this that circumstantial evidence must be clear or indices of corruption 




which allow one to conclude that corruption is established. Some indices for corruption may, or 
course, be given more or less weight than others in the circumstances of each case, and no rigid 
rules may be stated in this respect.  
     Llamzon (2014) has written that “circumstantial evidence, particularly when direct evidence 
of corruption is unavailable, is widely, albeit cautiously, accepted as a tool to evaluate 
allegations of corruption by international tribunals”. Also in ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12 Fraport 
AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (Award, 2014, 
para.479), the tribunal established that: 
The tribunal holds that considering the difficulty to prove corruption by direct 
evidence, the same may be circumstantial. However, in view of the consequences 
of corruption on the investor´s ability to claim the BIT protection, evidence must 
be clear and convincing so as to reasonably make believe that the facts, as alleged, 
have occurred.  
      Also, in ICSID Case No. ARB/10/03, Metal-Tech LTD. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan 
(Award, 2013, para.243) stated: 
The tribunal will determine on the basis of the evidence before it whether 
corruption has been established with reasonable certainty. In this context, it notes 
that corruption is by essence difficult to establish and that it is thus generally 
admitted that it can be shown through circumstantial evidence.  
      According to ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil 
Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Republic of Kazakhstan (Award, 29 July 2008), article 34 




admissibility of any evidence adduced and of its probative value”. Therefore, the tribunal is not 
bound by any legal system of procedure. It is free to determine the probative value of any 
evidence that has been produced, be it circumstantial or otherwise.  
     Some authors have expressed that there are special rules regarding circumstantial evidence 
known as connecting the dots and red flags. The first one is explained in Methanex Corp v. 
United States, UNCITRAL Award (August, 2005), observing that “while individual pieces of 
evidence when viewed in isolation may appear to have no significance, when seen together, they 
provide the most compelling of possible explanations of events”. Also, “connecting the dots is 
hardly a unique methodology; but when it is applied, it is critical, first, that all the relevant dots 
be assembled; and, second, that each be examined, in its own context, for its own significance, 
before a possible pattern in essayed”. In other words, the first special rule of circumstantial 
evidence it is a way to connect certain points that are evident through the process and together 
would show a corrupt act.  
      The second special rule is known as red flags. According to Laird and others (2018, p.97) 
“red flags are series of actions, typically representative of fraudulent activity, such as locations in 
tax havens, multiple beneficial owners, multiple transactions through bearer shares, cash 
transaction etc.” In ICSID Case No. ARB/10/03, Metal-Tech LTD. v. The Republic of 
Uzbekistan (Award, 2013, para.293) the tribunal explained that:  
For the application of the prohibition of corruption, the international community has 
established lists of indicators, sometimes called “red flags”. Several red flag lists exist, 
which, although worded differently, have essentially the same content. For instance, Lord 
Woolf, former Chief Justice of England and Wales, included on his list of ‘Key Red 




‘non-residence of an Adviser in the country where the customer or the project is located;’ 
(3) ‘no significant business presence of the Adviser within the country; (4) ‘an Adviser 
requests ‘urgent’ payments or unusually high commissions;’ (5) ‘an Adviser requests 
payments be paid in cash, use of a corporate vehicle such as equity, or be paid in a third 
country, to a numbered bank account, or to some other person or entity;’ (6) ‘an Adviser 
has a close personal/professional relationship to the government or customers that could 
improperly influence the customer’s decision’. 
     In this leading case, Metal Tech was an Israeli investor in Uzbekistan, which alleged that its 
investment had been expropriated and claimed compensation under the treaty between Israel and 
Uzbekistan. The state objected that the investments had been promoted through corrupt 
payments to officials, and that the tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction over the dispute. In the 
course of the arbitration, Metal-Tech acknowledged having paid 4 million dollars to three Uzbek 
advisors.  
     As to the standard of proof, the tribunal limited itself to stating that it is difficult to prove the 
existence of corruption, due to its own nature, and that it is almost always done through 
circumstantial evidence. After a joint assessment of the entire evidence, the arbitral tribunal 
concluded that the payments made to the 3 advisors masked corrupt payments, which constituted 
a crime in Uzbekistan. So, it determined that the investor had not fulfilled his duty to invest in 
accordance with the laws of Uzbekistan, and that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and the tribunal 
dismissed the case.  
     In conclusion, a red flag is a fact, event, or set of circumstances, or other information that may 




particularly with regard to corrupt practices and non-compliance with anti-corruption laws. A red 
flag list is a tool for inquiry and manage corruption risks around the international world.  
      Lastly, corruption is considered a misconduct with serious consequences. From my point of 
view, corruption should be established using solid and consistent evidence. By means of 
evidence that will satisfy the burden and standard of proof in each case. Although, arbitral 
tribunals have authority to freely choose which evidence is admissible or which is excluded, 
when allegations of corruption arose, the tribunal should apply a higher standard of proof due to 
the seriousness of the corruption allegations and the legal repercussions that could exists and in 
this way achieve, as I will analyze in the next chapter, that any indicator of corruption contains 














Chapter 3: Evaluating the State Liability 
     From the international perspective, international responsibility is understood as the obligation 
of a state to repair and satisfy another state for the consequences of a wrongful act (Arellano, 
1993, p.211). Peaceful coexistence among states that composes the international community, is 
based on compliance with international legal obligations, as well as the establishment of a 
liability scheme that allows compensation for damages arising from a possible breach.  
      After more than fifty years of work, the International Law Commission codified the general 
(customary) regime for state responsibility in the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which were adopted in 2001. The law of state responsibility is 
based on the distinction between two types of rules: primary rules, which are those that establish 
the obligations of states, and secondary rules, which are concerned with the breach of primary 
rules and with the consequences of such breach; the term state responsibility is now widely used 
to denote secondary rules (Fitzmaurice, 2008, p.1).  
      The ILC codification is divided in three important parts: the first one is the responsibility of 
states for internationally wrongful acts of 20018, the second one is the prevention of 
transboundary harm from hazardous activities of 20019, and the draft principles on the allocation 
of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities of 200610.   
     The ILC Responsibility Articles on state responsibility apply to all types of international 
obligations regardless of their source, subject matter, or importance to the international 
                                                             
8 Text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a 
part of the Commission´s report covering the work of that session.  
9 Text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a 
part of the Commission´s report covering the work of that session.  
10 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the 




community. They apply to both acts and omissions, to treaty obligations and customary norms, 
to breaches of bilateral as well as multilateral obligations, and the whole gamut of particular 
subject areas, human rights law, environmental law, humanitarian law, economic law, the law of 
the sea and so forth (Bodansky and Crook, 2002, p.779-780).   
     Another important point to analyze here is the foundation of responsibility. In relation to this 
issue, the doctrine and international jurisprudence are divided, because for some, the 
international responsibility of the state derives simply from the breach of an international legal 
obligation (objective theory), while for others, there must also be fraudulent or culpable behavior 
on the part of the infringing state (subjective theory). It should be noted that the position that the 
ILC project has finally followed has been to adopt both theories, that is, the objective theory of 
state responsibility, dealing with unlawful acts perpetrated by agents or organs of the state, and a 
subjective theory for unlawful acts committed by individuals (Novak and Garcia, 2016, p.389-
460). For example, article 7 of the ILC Articles on state responsibility provide that an act of a 
person empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered an act of 
the state even if such person exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.  
     According to article 1 of chapter 1 of the Articles on the Responsibility of states for 
international wrongful acts, “Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the 
international responsibility of that state”. Also, article 2 explains that “There is an internationally 
wrongful act of a state when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the 
state under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
state”, established many times in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty.  
     Article 12 of the text states that “There is a breach of an international obligation by a state 




regardless of its origin or character”. In this context, the ILC refers to “obligation” because it 
presupposes a breach of any of the sources of international law, such as custom, a treaty, a 
general principle of international law, a unilateral act of the state or acts of international 
organizations, and may also be derived from a judicial judgment or an arbitral award.  
      To analyze the liability of a state in cases where allegations of corruption appear, it is 
essential to establish what behavior attributable to a person, contrary to international law, 
generates responsibility. To determine this, it is necessary to define who has representation of the 
state by mandate of internal law. The quality of an agent is determined by the internal law of 
each state (Novak and Garcia, 2016, p.389-460). Article 4 of the ILC stated the first rule:  
1. The conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the state, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of 
the state.  
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the  
internal law of the state. 
      As a result, it is a universal principle that a state is responsible for the actions of agents who 
act in the exercise of their functions. However, article 7 of the ILC, as I explained above, also 
provides for the international responsibility of the state when an agent exceeds his functions or 
contravenes instructions. On the other hand, if a person acts in an individual capacity and 
committed wrongful act, there would be no responsibility for the state. All of the above is 




3.1. Asymmetry in investor-state cases involving corruption allegations 
       As I explained above, in international law, states are held to account for internationally 
wrongful acts through the law on state responsibility. A state is a juridical entity, after all, and its 
incorporeal being can only operate through the corporeal acts of the individuals and groups that 
represent it; these are by necessity deemed the acts of the state itself (Laird and others, 2018, 
p.99). However, some authors like Llamzon (2014) have established that when it comes to 
allegations of wrongdoing in investor-state arbitration, an investor is held solely responsible for 
creating an asymmetry.  
      This asymmetry relates, in the context of investment-related disputes, to the usual scenario 
where the investor lodges a claim against a host state through investor-state arbitration. 
However, recent years have seen a steady rise in investment treaty cases where host states have 
defeated a claim by the investor by invoking the defense of corruption. Thus, when a tribunal 
rejects an investment treaty claim at the jurisdictional stage on a finding of corruption involving 
both the investor and the state, an asymmetry is created wherein the investor with potentially 
legitimate investment claims is penalized and the state is exonerated from any liability arising 
from breach of its treaty obligations and even, unjustly enriched.  
     In words of Laird and others (2018, p.99): 
States are routinely made responsible for the breaches of international obligations 
committed by their representatives, and a State is not excused from responsibility 
for acts perpetrated by its public officials simply because those acts were illegal, 
unsanctioned, or otherwise outside their scope of authority. When a Head of State 




expropriation of an investment, for example, or a State’s domestic courts render 
judgments that disrupt the financial viability of an investor’s investment, the State 
itself is routinely held liable by arbitral tribunals, and it is no argument that the 
public official acted in excess of his powers or contrary to national law, or that 
courts are independent and cannot be controlled by the government and thus could 
not have been acting on behalf of that State. 
     In conclusion, in most cases where public officials of a state participated in corruption, almost 
never seems to engage the responsibility of the state; although, international rules and regulations 
establish otherwise.  
          A good example of this asymmetry is provided by the World Duty Free v. Kenya case. In 
the award rendered in that case, the arbitral tribunal dismissed the claim in the understanding that 
corruption is contrary to international public order, Kenyan law and English law. In this case, the 
bribe was made by the investor of the president of Kenya; however, according to the arbitral 
tribunal the president´s actions did not represent an action of the Kenyan state because “the 
payment to President Moi was ´covert´, its receipt is not legally to be imputed to Kenya itself´ 
(Laird and others, 2018, p.100). Also, the investor was party to the bribe, and for that reason the 
tribunal found that the claimant´s claim had no foundation. In that way, Kenya was released from 
liability.  
     In this type of contract obtained through corrupt payments, as we can see in this case, the 
disputes arise when the corrupting company demands the fulfillment of the contract, and the state 
opposes, alleging as a defense that the contract was obtained through corrupt payments in this 
case the arbitral tribunal must take into account the conduct of each party, to determine the 




      Another case that shows this asymmetry is the Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan case, analyzed 
above. In this case, the tribunal also dismissed the case because of lack of jurisdiction.  Very 
large sums of money had been paid to consultants and the question was whether sums of money 
had been paid as a bribe or had been paid for lawful services (ARB/10/03, 2013, para.244-266). 
Moreover, in this case, the responsibility of proving corruption fell on the plaintiff; however, the 
tribunal concluded that the claimant was unable to substantiate its contention that actual services 
had been carried out for legitimate purposes. Also, according to the tribunal, the investment was 
not implemented in accordance with the BIT, enough reasons to dismissed the claim.  
     However, in this case also the responsibility fell on the investor, but what happens with the 
payments received by the agents of the government of Uzbekistan? The tribunal breaks again 
with the general principles of state responsibility dismissing the case.  
      In addition, the Spentex v. Uzbekistan ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, also shows this 
asymmetry. The claimant in this case was Spentex Netherlands, B.V. (SNBV), a company 
incorporated in the Netherlands, and the respondent was the Republic of Uzbekistan. Spentex 
initiated an ICSID arbitration in September 2013 on the basis of the Netherlands-Uzbekistan 
BIT, Uzbek investment law, an Investment Agreement between the Uzbek government and 
Spentex Industries Limited (SIL) and the ICSID Convention (Betz, 2017, p.128). In this award 
still unpublished, the tribunal found that the investor was engaged in corrupt practices in the 
making of its investment, so dismissed its claim. On the other hand, also the tribunal found the 
respondent state was engaged in corrupt practices and for the first time reprimanded the 
respondent state by urging it to make a substantial payment to an international anti-corruption 
institution, under threat of an adverse costs order. The arbitrators penalized both the investor and 




      It is not common that in the context of investment arbitration, the consequences of a positive 
funding of corruption for the respondent state to be investigated and sanctioned. After having 
analyzed the responsibility of the state in these cases, there is no doubt that it bears liability for 
the respondent state in the case of inducing the claimant investor to commit an act of corruption. 
It seems clear in this case the imbalance between the investor and the state that has not been 
analyzed yet. It is clearly necessary a more immediate reaction to host states´ corrupt behavior 
(Asoskov, Muranov, Khodykin, 2018, p.178).  
3.2 State liability in the Chevron v. Ecuador case 
      Considered one of the largest cases of environmental pollution, this case began in 1991 with 
the complaints of indigenous communities and farmers affected by oil spills of the company 
Texaco, acquired in 2001 Chevron, in the Amazon of Ecuador between 1964 and 1990. The case 
began with a sentence issued by a court in Lago Agrio, Ecuador in 2011 that ordered to pay a 
compensation of 9.500 million dollars to those affected. After two years, the Ecuadorian 
National Court of Justice, ratified the first sentence but issued another sum of money of 8.600 
million dollars in reparations for the environmental damages in one of the areas of greatest 
biodiversity in the world. However, Chevron appealed the rulings and litigated the court 
decisions before national courts in Ecuador and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague.  I will try to explain basically the four stages before the arbitral award of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal:  
 Lago Agrio Judgment of 14 February 2011: According to the award “the Lago Agrio 
Judgment appears to be a lengthy, detailed, reasoned and powerful decision” (Award, 
2018, para. 5.4). The Lago Agrio Judgment contains a lengthy passage addressing the 




shoes of both Texaco and TexPet (Award, 2018, para 5.18). In this judgement one of the 
principles and rules that prevails is the principle of good faith. However, one of the major 
problems is that the claimants content that the Lago Agrio Judgement incorporated eight 
sets of material which were never actually filed by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs during the 
Lago Agrio Litigation, and were thus never seen by the claimants during that litigation. 
      As the PCA tribunal established at part V of the award on page I, this judgment 
“awards US$ 18.2 billion in damages to be paid by Chevron, including US$ 8.6 billion as 
punitive damages subject to a timely public apology by Chevron, with a 10% award to 
the ADF”. Also, the beneficiary of compensation “shall be the Amazon Defense Front or 
the person or persons it designates, considering that those affected by the environmental 
harm are undetermined”, stated the “trust” (C-931, p.186-187).  
       An important issue that was discussed in this process was that if the Judge 
Zambrano, who was in charge of the case, was the one who wrote or did not write the 
Lago Agrio Judgment. After the evidence was analyzed, the tribunal determined that 
Judge Zambrano did not prepare the Judgment, since the time and the amount of material 
and evidence given in the case was huge, and a Judgment would not be written in less 
than three months as he specified in his declaration. In part 5.17 of the award, the tribunal 
stated that “it was ´ghostwritten´ by certain of the Lago Agrio Plaintiff´s representatives 
with Judge Zambrano´s corrupt connivance”. Also, the Lago Agrio Judgment 
incorporated eight sets of material which were never filed by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs 
during the Lago Agrio Litigation, and were thus never seen by the Claimants during that 
Litigation. It is noticed from here that corruption played an important role in Ecuadorian 





 Judgment of the Lago Agrio Appellate Court of 3 January 2012: “By its judgment of 3 
January 2012, extending over 16 pages, the Lago Agrio Appellate Court affirmed the 
Lago Agrio Judgment. It upheld the punitive damages award because Chevron had 
refused publicly to “apologize”. It also decided that it could not address Chevron´s fraud 
allegations regarding the conduct of the Lago Agrio Litigation” (PCA, 2018, Part V – 
Page 49). Also, the Appellate Court confirmed that claims were diffuse and not as 
individual claims by a plaintiff seeking compensation for personal harm to that individual 
plaintiff.  
      As to Chevron´s “fraud allegations, the appellate courts established that:  
 
Mention is also made of fraud and corruption of plaintiffs, counsel and 
representatives, a matter to which this Division should not refer at all, except to let 
it be emphasized that the same accusations are pending resolution before 
authorities of the United States of America due to a complaint that has been filed 
by the very defendant here, Chevron, under what is known as the RICO act, and 
this Division has no competence to rule on the conduct of counsel, experts or 
other officials or administrators and auxiliaries of justice, if that were the case. 
     
       At paragraphs 5.171 the tribunal established that “the appellate court specifically 
refused to fulfil its obligation to perform a comprehensive review of both the facts and 
the law regarding the dispute, as well as the allegations of fraud, as Chevron Corporation 





 Judgment of Cassation Court of 12 November 2013: The Cassation Court reduced the 
Lago Agrio Judgment´s award of damages to US$8.6 billion, with 10% to be paid to the 
ADF. Also, the tribunal established that the Court “did not review the merits of any of 
Chevron´s allegations of fraud in the conduct of the Lago Agrio Litigation or the 
´ghostwriting´ of the Lago Agrio Judgment. However, in commenting upon the Cassation 
Court´s lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate upon Chevron´s allegations, the Cassation Court 
noted that these allegations were being heard in the pending RICO litigation in New 
York, USA” (PCA, 2018, Part V – Pages 57-58).  
       The grounds for Chevron’s cassation appeal included: (i) the inadequate application, 
lack of application or erroneous interpretation of procedural rules resulting in the 
irremediable nullity of the proceedings or in the appellant’s defenselessness, provided 
they have influenced the judgment and that the respective nullity has not been legally 
validated; (ii) the judgment’s lack of formal requirements provided for by law or the 
adoption of incompatible or contradictory decisions in the judgment’s operative part; (iii) 
an extra petita or infra petita judgment; (iv) the inadequate application, lack of 
application or erroneous interpretation of applicable evidentiary rules, provided they lead 
to an erroneous application or to the lack of application of legal rules in the judgment; 
and (v) the inadequate application, lack of application or erroneous interpretation of 
applicable legal rules, including mandatory judicial precedent, which were determinative 
for the judgment’s operative part. In short, these grounds included Chevron’s fraud 





       Reading the Award of the PCA, the tribunal concluded that the Cassation Court did 
not review any expert reports, did not review whether there had been any procedural 
fraud committed by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs´ representatives and did not consider 
anything about the “ghostwritten”. 
 
 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 27 June 2018: The Constitutional Count issues 
its judgement on 27 June 2018, affirming the judgment of the Cassation National Count, 
following public hearing held on 16 July 2015 and 22 may 2018. The Constitutional 
Court declared that there is no violation of constitutional law, as alleged by Chevron; the 
Court rejected the Extraordinary Action of Protection made by Chevron; and it ordered 
its judgment to be recorded, published and enforced (PCA, 2018, Part V – Page 58). 
 
      Under Chapter 1 of the Judgment, the Constitutional Court decides that there was no 
infringement of Chevron’s “right to be tried by a competent judge and in pursuance of the 
corresponding due process of law applicable to each proceeding”; the Lago Agrio Court, 
the Lago Agrio Appellate Court and the Cassation Court. 
        The Constitutional Court decides that the Cassation Court had no power to decide 
Chevron’s allegations of procedural fraud. It states, as follows: 
It should be remarked that the cassation appeal does not constitute another 
trial stage in the court proceedings, wherein issues of fact previously 
reviewed by the trial court judges can be freely discussed; but rather, it is 
by means of the cassation appeal that the judges of the National Court of 
Justice, who are in charge of hearing such an appeal, undertake a review of 




application of the rules of law within their judgments or orders intended to 
close declaratory proceedings or trials. It is thereby ruled out any 
possibility that the cassation court judges may order the production and 
examination of evidence, make any assessment of the evidentiary elements 
or being to discuss any facts previously heard by the trial court judges, 
since any such actions would result in an infringement of judicial 
independence and legal certainty, duly guaranteed by the Constitution of 
the Republic of Ecuador.  
        The Constitutional Court decided that the Cassation Court had no power to decide 
Chevron´s allegations of procedural fraud and that the Cassation Court´s Judgement did not 
breach any constitutional right.  
      After the different phases of this long process, Chevron appealed the judgments at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration or PCA. The PCA tribunal held in an award of 2018 that 
Ecuador must pay to Chevron compensation for damages to be fixed subsequently. In part VIII 
of the award, the tribunal addressed the merits of the Claimant´s claims and the Respondent´s 
defenses under the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard and customary international law in 
Article II(3)(a) of the Treaty and under the umbrella clause in Article II(3)(c) of the Treaty.  
      Regarding the obligations observance clauses, namely, umbrella clauses, are aimed to elevate 
contractual and other commitments of host states under an investment treaty´s protective 
umbrella, the arbitral tribunal found that Chevron was released of responsibility under the 1995 
settlement agreement. As a result, the tribunal had held, although the settlement agreement did 
not protect the claimants from claims of individual harm, it did protect both claimants from any 




fell within the protective rubric of the BIT´s umbrella clause, meaning that any failure by the 
Ecuadorian legal system to comply with the settlement would consequently breach the BIT 
(Hepburn, 2018).  
     In paragraphs 8.9 of the award, the tribunal established that “in the tribunal´s view, by acts of 
its judicial branch, attributable to the Respondent under article 4 of the ILC articles on state 
responsibility, the Respondent violated its obligations under article II (3)(c) of the treaty, 
committing international wrongs towards each of Chevron and TexPet”. In conclusion, the 
tribunal decided that Ecuador was liable to make reparation to Chevron.  
      Referring to the ¨ghostwriting¨ of the Lago Agrio Judgment, the arbitral tribunal decided that 
“the Judge Zambrano did not write the Lago Agrio Judgment”, and that the Judge Zambrano did 
receive a bribe of US$500.000. According to articles 4 and 7 of the ILC articles, the misconduct 
of Judge Zambrano and also other judges of the Lago Agrio Court was attributable to Ecuador. 
On part 8 paragraph 52, the tribunal concluded that “there can be no question as regards the 
attribution to the respondent of an international wrong committed by the Lago Agrio Court (with 
the Lago Agrio Appellate, Cassation and Constitutional Courts), as the judicial branch of the 
respondent acting in such capacity in the Lago Agrio Litigation”.  
      The arbitral tribunal also decided referring to the denial of justice that “the tribunal adopted 
the claimants’ description that this ‘must be the most thorough documentary, video, and 
testimonial proof of fraud ever put before an arbitral tribunal’. Thus, a denial of justice was held 
to have occurred on March 1, 2012, when the Lago Agrio judgment became enforceable. The 
judgment was ‘clearly improper and discreditable’, and the appeal process had failed to correct 




       In the tribunal´s final conclusions, “the Tribunal decides that the Respondent is liable to 
make reparations to each of Chevron and TexPet for injuries caused by the breaches of the FET 
standard and customary international law in Article II(3)(a) of the Treaty and for breaches of the 
Umbrella Clause in Article II(3)(c) of the Treaty, as further addressed in Parts IX and X below” 
(PCA, 2018 Part VIII-Page 21).  
     Finally, as we can establish from the information and issues above, this is one of the more 
serious cases of judicial corruption, the Lago Agrio Judgment breached principles such as the 
rule of law, access to justice and public confidence in the legal system. This Judgment violated 
international public order and determined the liability of a state in an arbitral award when 
corruption is alleged. According to the above, all states should not recognize or enforce the Lago 
Agrio Judgment.  
3.3 Approach to the relationship between corruption and the environment 
    “The energy giant Chevron beats Ecuador in an International Tribunal for the case of pollution 
of Lago Agrio”. This was the headline of a new in the portal of BBC News of 7 September 
201811. The Chevron case, as I analyze it from the perspective of the responsibility of the State 
of Ecuador, it is not simply a case of litigation over environmental issues and pollution. It reveals 
the power of corruption in countries where the leadership has no respect for the rule of law and 
how corruption can affect the environment.  
     Corruption is an issue that has gained prominence in Latin America, as I explained above. 
Recently, it has emerged a relationship between corruption and the environment, it has been 
shown that corruption has serious consequences for the environment. Also, corruption exists at 
                                                             




all levels, from embezzlement during the execution of environmental programs or contracts to 
large-scale corruption when issuing permits and licenses for the exploitation of natural resources, 
including bribes to officials. When corruption causes the loss of resources and habitats and the 
destruction of ecosystems on which billions of people around the world depend, both societies 
and the environment suffer consequences (UNODC, 2015).  
      One of the major problems discussed in the Chevron case was water pollution. Ecuador 
accused the US company of causing environmental damage, mainly to water sources of the 
population of Ecuador, especially indigenous communities, through the work carried out by 
Texaco in the region of Lago Agrio. The pollution included crude oil as the arbitral tribunal 
stated in paragraph 4.71 of the award “There is today crude oil pollution in the former 
concession area of the Oriente, including pollution lying close to human habitation”.  
     Corruption in the water sector is a serious concern in many ways. As a source of energy, 
drinking or for sanitation purposes, water is a basic human need. Unfortunately, everyday 
millions of people have difficulty meeting that need. The water sector is especially vulnerable by 
corruption for various reasons. The main one is the large number of instances that intervene in 
the sector, including public and private entities. When a lot of money moves and transparency if 
lacking, the negotiation of contracts, assignments, agreements and licenses suffers.  
      However, in the arbitration administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration or PCA, the 
tribunal issued a decision on the dispute. The decision, which is binding, rejected a 2011 decision 
of the Ecuadorian judicial system that ordered Chevron to pay UDS 9.5000 million 
compensation for environmental and other damages that took place in the Amazonian region of 
Ecuador, supposedly due to oil pollution. The PCA held that the judgment of the Ecuadorian 




criticized the Ecuadorian court and the judge of the case, alleging that they violated international 
public order.  
      Regarding to this, the PCA tribunal (Award, 9.16, 2018) held that:  
In World Duty Free (2006), in the context of corruption by bribery, the tribunal 
identified, as a matter of international public policy, an international consensus as 
to universal standard and accepted norms of conduct that must be applied in all for 
a. It concluded: “In light of domestic laws and international conventions relating 
to corruption, and in light of the decisions taken in this matter by courts and 
arbitral tribunals, this Tribunal is convinced that bribery is contrary to the 
international public policy of most, if not all, States …”. In the Tribunal´s view, 
judicial bribery must rank as one of the more serious cases of corruption, striking 
as the rule of law, access to justice and public confidence in the legal system; and 
also, as regards the foreign enforcement of a corrupt judgment, at the law of 
nations.  Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the Lago Agrio Judgement 
(with the judgements of the Lago Agrio Appellate, Cassation and Constitutional 
Courts) violates international public policy. As a matter of international comity, it 
must follow that the Lago Agrio Judgment should not be recognized or enforced 
by the courts of other states.  
     The huge problem was that in 2007 Rafael Correa was elected President of Ecuador. Correa, a 
leftist, became interested in the case when he tried to influence the decision of the court causing 
the detriment of Chevron through a multimillion-dollar publicity campaign using public funds, a 
fact that was recently denounced by the current Ecuadorian government. The decision of the 




Constitutional Court of Ecuador. However, the members of the court that made that decision 
were tied to Correa, and obviously responded to his wishes, in the opinion of some Ecuadorians 
(Fleischman, 2018).  
     The government of Lenin Moreno, the current President of Ecuador, said in a statement that 
he requested audits to identify those responsible for the failed trial against Chevron. He promised 
that he will establish “civil, criminal and administrative responsibilities that may be brought 
against those responsible for the most serious damage caused to the Ecuadorian State”. The 
secretary of the Ecuadorian presidency, Eduardo Jurado, explained that the award exposed the 
state to the payment of amounts still undetermined, but that can already be expected large sums 
of money, which could cause serious damage for the treasury (BBC News, 2018). 
     But this problem goes much further than it seems. So far, I have only analyzed the 
relationship between corruption and the environment; but, it seems to be a relationship between 
human rights and corruption. It is clear, that the arbitral tribunal left aside and did not venture to 
decide in depth all items related to the victims. The arbitral tribunal did not clearly establish who 
is responsible for the environmental damage, it left without effect an Ecuadorian internal 
judgment that had given reason and hope for an entire community in Ecuador to determine 
responsibility for that water pollution. In this regard, the tribunal (Award, 7.39, 2018) held:  
In the Tribunal´s view, therefore, it remains clear that individual claims for 
personal harm from environmental damage, made by the Aguinda Plaintiffs in the 
Aguinda Litigation in New York or similar claims for personal harm (not being 
diffuse claims) made by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio Litigation, 
are not and cannot be claims asserted by the Respondent in its own right against 




       The right to water is not limited to personal consumption; it is also used for sustainable 
development, for activities such as agriculture. In addition, the water must be safe and therefore 
free of microorganisms, chemical substances or risk of radiation that constitute a threat to health 
(CEPAL, 2011). In this case, this human right protection remains a responsibility of the 
Ecuadorian administration. The victims of these acts of political and judicial corruption should 
seek that their government find the persons or entities responsible for the environmental damage, 


















      Corruption is considered one of the biggest threats to humanity in both developing and 
developed countries because it distorts economic growth, lowers foreign direct investment, and 
decreases productivity on a firm level due to inefficient allocations of contracts. Corruption also 
impedes the general societal and economic environment because it reduces voluntary 
contributions to public goods, increases inequality, facilitated emigration of highly skilled people 
and creates inefficiencies in the sport sector. In conclusion, corruption is a cancer. These 
considerations not only show the economic drawbacks, but also highlight ethical implications on 
how society as a whole is affected by corruption.  
      To conclude this study, corruption allegations in international arbitration have risen and there 
is no reason to think that this trend will slow in the future. Arbitrators face up allegations of 
corruption at any arbitral stage. They principally diverge on issues such as what is the proper 
burden of proof and standard of proof, how far the powers and duties of arbitral tribunals extend, 
and who is responsible. There is no clear consensus among arbitral tribunals to answers this, but 
they have adopted positions on these issues that have make it easier to deal with cases where 
corruption arises. Succeeding these considerations, the following points represent important 
references when allegations of corruption appear in international arbitration: 
      [1] Corruption is a violation of, or distortion of, fundamental rules, laws, policies, or 
exploitation of trust to provide illegal or unauthorized privileges and undue advantages, in 
exchange for either personal or third party gain, but to the detriment of public interest.  
      [2] The greatest challenge arbitral tribunals encounter in the face of corruption allegations is 




There are not international rules, national rules, institutional rules or principles that determine a 
standard of proof. Arbitral tribunals have discretionary authority to establish the standard of 
proof in each case. In some cases, arbitral tribunals proceeded from the premise that the usual 
standard is a higher one derived from criminal law.  In others, on the contrary, arbitrators applied 
an ordinary standard derived from civil law. The concept of circumstantial evidence and red 
flags, however, have been used to determine the existence of corruption or its elements. But the 
truth is that, nowadays, arbitral tribunals have established that a higher standard of proof is 
necessary to determine corruption in an arbitral case. It seems that this approach is the most 
appropriate in arbitration cases where arbitrators are to deal with the issues of corruption due to 
the gravity of the corruption allegations and its significant legal consequences. Being an 
arbitrator should not be an easy job to do, however from this perspective, they must be willing 
during the entire arbitration process to face allegations of corruption from a neutral point of 
view, willing to help not just establishing an appropriate standard of proof, but also by clarifying 
the dispute.  
      [3] Regarding the state liability, corruption defense has emerged as a potent tool for host 
states to defeat investor claims in cases where the contract in question was obtained through 
corruption. The drastic and one-sided approach that tribunals have adopted in resolving the 
corruption issue practically eliminates all equitable considerations in favor of the investor. When 
the tribunal regards the investment as tainted with corruption, any licit basis for an arbitration 
proceeding disappears. This not only yields detrimental consequences for the investor who is 
deprived of full access to investment treaty protection; it also creates a powerful incentive for 
states to cultivate a culture of corruption in order to escape liability for breach of their 




explained above, only in one case, the respondent state was actually sentenced to pay for 
inducing the investor to corrupt actions, it was the Spentex v. Uzbekistan ICSIC Case. A more 
immediate reaction to host states´ corrupt behavior is needed. It is necessary that states cooperate 
with courts in their fighting against corruption. In addition, considering the whole system of 
international norms, rules and principles, there should be a list of sanctions on investments in 
those cases where a state alleges corruption by an investor but the state also was the originator of 
these corrupt actions.  
      [4] Bad administrative and judicial practices, and corruption are present in our daily lives. At 
the same time, we are going through an environmental crisis in which these wrongdoing 
practices may have irreversible effects when they affect the environment. For this, it is important 
that the states adopt the protection of the environment as a factor of safeguard and concretization 
of other fundamental rights. They must adopt measures such as transparency in the accounts and 
decisions that affect the environment and allow the participation of citizens so that corruption 
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